Roger Williams University

DOCS@RWU
Law Faculty Scholarship

Law Faculty Scholarship

2019

The Hard, Simple Truth about Gun Control
Carl Bogus
Roger Williams University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/law_fac_fs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Second Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of
the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
“The Hard, Simple Truth about Gun Control,” in Guns in Law, edited by Austin Sarat (Amherst,
Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2019)

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Scholarship at DOCS@RWU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For
more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

The Hard, Simple Truth about Gun Control
Carl T. Bogus ∗
Gun control can be extremely effective at significantly reducing homicides, suicides, and
gun-related robberies, assaults, and injuries. There is substantial evidence supporting that
conclusion. However, the simple, hard truth is that only one form of gun control has been shown
to be effective – namely, anything that significantly reduces the number of handguns in general
circulation. The implications of that argument are enormous. In 2008, the United States Supreme
Court held that individuals have a constitutional right to have handguns in their homes, and
therefore a system of regulation designed to reduce the number of handguns in American homes
would be unconstitutional. Gun control advocates faced political obstacles before that ruling.
Rather than acknowledge the simple, hard truth, they opted instead to advocate so-called
common sense measures, even though there is little evidence suggesting modest measures are
likely to be effective. That strategy led to Pyrrhic victories. The strategy was counterproductive
for public opinion over the long run, and it may well have misled Supreme Court justices into
believing that their Second Amendment decision had no adverse public health consequences. It
is, therefore, important to be clear about the choice before us. The choice is not whether America
will have effective gun control today. It can’t. The choice is whether America will have effective
gun control in the future. While public opinion, politics, and constitutional law currently bar the
way, all three are malleable. The public, politicians, and judges can all be educated. That must
begin, however, with telling the simple, hard truth about gun control.
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The Hard, Simple Truth about Gun Control
Carl T. Bogus ∗

I.
There are two kinds of people: those who divide the world into two kinds of people and
those who don’t. That old joke gets at the heart of the simple truth about gun control. The
general consensus today is that society is divided into two kinds of people: those who can
be trusted with guns and those who cannot. The goal is to devise a system of firearm
regulation that allows responsible people to own guns and denies them to irresponsible
people. Both gun control advocates and opponents implicitly accept that basic approach,
even though they passionately disagree about how to implement it. Elected officials, who
have little time to study the issue and rely on what advocacy groups on their side of the
ideological divide tell them, also accept the consensus model. The problem with that model,
however, is that it is stems from fantasy. Society is not divided into two kinds of people;
things are far more complicated than that. Moreover, even to the extent that there may be
some kind of division between the trustworthy and the untrustworthy, it is not possible to
devise a regulatory scheme that can effectively distinguish between the two. Nor will that
ever be possible. The implacable obstacle to the consensus model is human nature, and that
is not going to change.
That does not mean effective gun control is impossible. It is possible, and in fact, it has
long existed in other affluent nations. Rhetoric about American exceptionalism
notwithstanding, human beings in America are not different than human beings elsewhere.
As we shall see, what makes the United States different from other affluent nations is not its
level of violence, but its level of lethal violence – and that difference is due to the prevalence
of guns. Other nations are horrified by the level of lethal violence we tolerate. If we regulated
guns the way other countries do, we would save more lives and avoid more injuries than
U.S. Armed Forces experience in wars.
Why do Americans accept so much unnecessary carnage? For some Americans, the
choice is a conscious one. They are willing to pay the price of living in a society with more
gun-related homicides, injuries, robberies, assaults, and suicides in order to have what they
perceive to be freedom. The Founders, they believe, bequeathed us a sacred Second
Amendment right. But for most Americans, the choice is largely unexamined. Because they
don’t hear people advocating for a different model, they assume that no other model is
possible. They are not sure whether it is unavailable as a matter of constitutional law,
politics, or sociology. They haven’t thought it through far enough to ask whether another
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model is possible. Quite understandably, what they consider is framed by what they hear,
and what they hear from all sides involves some variation of the good guy/bad guy model.
Gun control advocates routinely say that we must adopt “common sense” measures that
keep guns out of the hands of criminals, the dangerously mentally ill, and potential terrorists
while allowing responsible citizens to own guns. 1 That, pretty much, is what everyone
believes. The principal difference is that the gun control supporters stress keeping guns out
of the hands of the irresponsible while gun control opponents stress allowing the responsible
to own and carry guns. For example, Hillary Clinton’s official presidential campaign
platform stated that she “has a record of advocating for commonsense approaches to reduce
gun violence,” and favored keeping “guns out of the hands of domestic abusers, other violent
criminals, and the severely mentally ill.” 2 Meanwhile, in his official presidential campaign
platform Donald Trump said:
Here’s another important way to fight crime – empower law-abiding gun owners to
defend themselves. Law enforcement is great, they do a tremendous job, but they
can’t be everywhere all of the time. Our personal protection is ultimately up to us.
That’s why I’m a gun owner, that’s why I have a concealed carry permit, and that’s
why tens of millions of Americans have concealed carry permits as well. It’s just
common sense. To make America great again, we’re going to go after criminals
and put the law back on the side of the law-abiding. 3
To say that both sides agree on the same basic model is not to say that both sides are in
basic agreement. They are not. Gun control advocates want more rigorous restrictions on
gun ownership and gun control opponents want either no more restrictions or want to relax
existing restrictions. The issue that Trump mentioned – concealed carry permits – is a
particular case in point: gun-rights organizations want private citizens to be able to carry
concealed weapons on the public streets while gun control opponents do not want them to.
This may be a significant detail, but it is a detail nonetheless. Whether or not citizens should
be able to carry concealed handguns on the streets, both sides implicitly accept the same
fundamental model that good guys should be able to possess handguns and bad guys should
not.
What other model is possible? While it isn’t possible to meaningfully divide people into
two clear categories, it is possible to do that with gun control models. The two fundamental
models are these: (1) everyone may possess a handgun except those who cannot; and (2) no
one may possess a handgun except those who can. Note, first, that I have focused on
handguns, not all guns. I shall, in due course, explain why the difference between handguns
and long guns – that is, rifles and shotguns – is so important. The second thing to note is that
despite the symmetry in descriptions, these are two fundamentally different models. The first
model allows anyone to possess a handgun unless he or she demonstrably falls into a
1

A search in the Westlaw news data base for articles that contain the phrase “common sense” within ten words of
the phrase “gun control,” conducted on January 13, 2017, found more than three thousand such articles. Typically,
those advocating for “common sense gun control” are gun control advocates, but occasionally gun control opponents
also use the phrase. For example, in his official campaign platform Donald Trump supported
2
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/gun-violence-prevention/
3
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Second_Amendment_Rights.pdf (This document accessed by hyper-jump from
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/constitution-and-second-amendment.)
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prohibited category, such as being a convicted felon, mentally ill, on a terrorist watch list, or
the like. The second model allows no one to possess a handgun unless he or she falls into an
exempted category, such as being a law enforcement officer, a member of the military, a
security guard, or having a special need to own a handgun. Who among the general public
has a special need to own a handgun? Although it may be a bit dated, my favorite example
is Salman Rushdie, following the fatwa issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini calling for
Rushdie’s execution. 4 A more pedestrian example might be women who reasonably fear
attack from a stalker. 5 Once again, while the details are not unimportant, they are details
nonetheless. The basic difference between the two models is that the first presumptively
grants a right to own a handgun to everyone, except those who demonstrably fit into special
categories. The second model presumptively grants a right to own a handgun to no one,
except those who demonstrably fit into special categories. The most consequential difference
between the two models is that there will be far fewer handguns in general circulation under
the second model than the first. That, as we shall see, makes all the difference in the world,
for there is one kind of gun control that works – and only one kind that works – and it is this:
anything that significantly reduces the number of handguns in general circulation.
That last sentence may bring some readers up short, for they immediately realize the
terrible implications of my argument. In 2008, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution grants individuals a right to keep
handguns in their homes. 6 Would a gun control program specifically designed to reduce the
number of handguns in general circulation be unconstitutional? And am I arguing that only
a program designed to accomplish that objective would be effective? The answers to both
questions, broadly speaking, are yes. That is the hard, simple truth about gun control.
Why, then, read on? Do you really want to learn that the only kind of gun control that
will be effective cannot be enacted into law? Suffice it say, for now, that I think you should
read on. To reduce the gun carnage in America, we need to be clear-eyed about the facts.
And, ultimately, we can in fact reduce the gun carnage.

II.
Donald Trump mentioned concealed carry because it is currently a hot political issue,
so let’s start with the ability to carry handguns in public places. There are two different
modes of handgun carry – open carry and concealed carry, depending upon whether one is
carrying a visibly displayed handgun, most commonly in a holster on one’s hip, or whether
4

See Salman Rushdie, The Disappeared: How the fatwa changed a writer’s life, The New Yorker, Sept. 17, 2012,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/09/17/the-disappeared.
5
I say “might” because there are different kinds of stalkers, some more dangerous than others, and there would have
to be a determination that an applicant for gun permit reasonably fears physical attack. It is indisputable, however,
that stalking threats are serious and widespread. Each year in the U.S. about 3.4 million people are victims of
stalking. Katrina Baum, et al., “Stalking Victimization in the United States,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jan. 2009,
1, available at https://victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/baum-k-catalano-s-rand-m-rose-k-2009.pdf?sfvrsn=0. Nearly a
third of stalking victims fear bodily harm, a quarter fear that child or some other family member will be hurt or
kidnapped, and about nine percent fear being killed. Ibid., 7. All too often, these fears are not groundless: 39,000
people in the U.S. are raped or sexually assaulted and 52,000 are seriously injured by stalkers. Ibid., 8. About three
percent of stalking victims get a gun for self-protection. Ibid., 6.
6
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-30 (2008).
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one is carrying a handgun concealed somewhere on one’s person, often in a pocket or in a
holster under a jacket. Only five states and the District of Columbia absolutely prohibit the
open carrying of handguns. 7 Of the remaining forty-five states, about one-third require a
license or permit to openly carry a handgun and two-thirds do not require a license or
permit. 8
Open carry has long been legally permitted in most states. It has never been much of an
issue because so few people do it. Legal restrictions on open carry have been largely
unnecessary because there is a strong cultural deterrent to openly carrying handguns: people
are afraid of other people that they see walking around in public places with a handgun
strapped to their waist. Restaurants, stores, and office buildings will ask gun-toting
individuals to leave their premises. Those that don’t do so are likely to see patrons quickly
depart. Some people call the police when they see someone carrying a gun in a public place,
and some police forces actively discourage open carry of weapons, even where it is permitted
by law. A spokesperson for the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania police department declared that
someone openly carrying a handgun should expect to be “inconvenienced” by, for example,
being ordered to lay on the ground while police checked his permit, a process that might take
some time as the first police officer on the scene might not approach the person he has – at
gunpoint – ordered to the ground until backup has arrived. 9 An organization named
OpenCarry.org is dedicated to trying to make open carry socially acceptable by encouraging
gun owners to openly carry guns more often. 10 Its motto is “A Right Unexercised is a Right
Lost.” A visit to its website suggests OpenCarry.org is struggling. Its events draw few
participants, and its website complains that even Utah police find ways to charge people who
are openly carrying firearms with disorderly conduct. 11 However, even if these activists
persuade police departments not to deliberately inconvenience people who are openly
carrying handguns in jurisdictions where that is legally allowed, the public is not likely to
be blasé about gun-toting people mingling with them in supermarkets, movie theaters,
libraries, and the like, and social pressure will continue to stop open carry from becoming
more common.
Because of the cultural impediments to open carry, the National Rifle Association
(NRA) and other pro-gun groups have focused on expanding concealed carry. 12 In the past,
7

The five states are California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and South Carolina. See “Open Carrying: Summary of
State Laws,” Lawyers Center to Prevent Gun Violence, http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/firearms-inpublic-places/open-carrying/#state.
8
A few states have mixed regulations. Pennsylvania, for example, requires a license to openly carry a firearm in the
City of Philadelphia, but does not require a license to do so elsewhere in the state. In North Dakota, someone
without a concealed weapons permit may openly carry an unloaded handgun during daylight hours while someone
with such a permit may openly carry a handgun during the day or night. Ibid.
9
Stephen Clark, After Altercation, Philadelphia Police Say They Won’t Look the Other Way on Open-Carry Gun
Owners, Fox News, May 21, 2011, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/21/altercationphiladelphia-police-say-wont-look-way-open-carry-gun-owners.html. An open-carry gun activist who was
inconvenienced in this manner sued Philadelphia and won a $25,000 judgment.
http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/philadelphia/35164-25000-judgment-in-suit-against-philly-overpermitted-gun.
10
http://www.opencarry.org/
11
http://www.opencarry.org/is-open-carry-disorderly-conduct/
12
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20170113/national-concealed-carry-reciprocity-lies-an8.d-the-lying-liars-who-tellthem
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most states either prohibited concealed carry entirely or had restrictive permitting systems. 13
Many states had “may issue” permit laws that gave the chief of police or other law
enforcement official the discretion to issue a concealed carry permit to individuals who had
special reasons to be armed. Chiefs of police typically granted few permits. The NRA,
therefore, started lobbying states to enact “shall issue” permit laws that require the chief of
police to issue a concealed carry permit to all applicants who do not fit into specified
categories, such as having a record of criminal convictions or mental illness. The NRA
lobbying effort got a big assist in 1997 when two economists, John R. Lott and David B.
Mustard, published a paper in which, using complex econometric models, they claimed to
have found an inverse statistical correlation between shall issue concealed carry laws and
violent crimes. 14 The following year Lott expanded his thesis into a book titled More Guns,
Less Crime. 15 Lott wrote:
Allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns reduces violent crimes, and the
reductions coincide very closely with the number of concealed-handgun permits
issued. Mass shootings in public places are reduced when law-abiding citizens are
allowed to carry concealed handguns. 16
Notice the term “law-abiding citizens.” It is the good guy/bad guy model that implicitly
explains Lott’s findings. The idea is that we can indeed sort out the good guys. Most
obviously, police run a criminal records check on people applying for concealed carry
permits, and criminals have criminal records. But, of course, that last statement cannot be
completely true, if only because some criminals have not yet been caught. But, I suggest,
there is another assumption lurking here, albeit unexamined: only good guys apply for
concealed carry permits. That is not how bad guys behave (even bad guys without rap
sheets).
Lott argued that concealed carry effectively deters violent crime because criminals are
hesitant to rob or attack people who may be armed. When criminals realize that some
significant fraction of potential victims are armed, but they cannot tell who is armed and
who is not, they make a rational decision to change their behavior. The Lott-Mustard model
showed that concealed carry laws were associated with a rise in property crime; Lott
suggested this was because criminals, finding it more risky to rob people who may turn out
to armed, turned to safer alternatives such as auto theft and other non-violent property
crimes. 17
The Lott-Mustard paper, and Lott’s book, created a sensation. 18 They supercharged
NRA lobbying efforts for concealed carry laws. By 2014, forty-one states had shall issue
concealed carry laws or allowed citizens to carry concealed weapons without a permit or

13

Dennis A. Henigan, “Guns Don’t Kill People, People Kill People” And Other Myths About Gun Control (Boston:
Beacon Press 2016), 122.
14
John R. Lott and David B. Mustard, “Crime, Deterrence, and the Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, Journal of
Legal Studies 26:1 (1997).
15
John R. Lott, More Guns, Less Crime (Chicago: U. Chicago Press 1998).
16
Ibid., 19.
17
Ibid., 19 and 54.
18
For example, on August 2, 1996, USA Today ran a prominent story about the paper titled “Fewer Rapes, Killings
Found Where Concealed Guns Legal.” Dennis A. Henigan, supra, at 130.
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license. 19 In 1999, 2.7 million Americans had concealed carry permits. By mid-2014, that
had increased to 11.1 million people. 20
There are two big problems with Lott’s “more guns, less crime” thesis. First, other
researchers discredited his econometric analysis. Lott compared change in crime during the
period 1985 to 1991 between states that adopted shall issue laws and those did not; he
claimed to find that smaller increases in crime in the first group than in the second group.
This was a period of time during which crime was rising nationally. Criminologists believed
that, in at least significant part, the rise was due to a skyrocketing use of crack cocaine,
especially in poor neighborhoods of large cities. 21 However, the two groups of states were
very different in this regard. For example, states that enacted shall issue laws included
Maine, Idaho, and Montana while those that did not enact such laws included New York,
California, and New Jersey. John J. Donohue and Ian Ayres, researchers at Stanford
University and Yale University, respectively, extended the Lott-Mustard analysis through
1997. Donohue explained their dramatic findings as follows: “When the Lott and Mustard
statistical model is run for the period in the 1990s when the spikes in crime reversed
themselves, suddenly shall-issue laws are associated with uniform increases in crime.” 22
Later, Donohue and Ayres extended their analysis still further to 2006, a period of
continuing decline in crime generally, and got similar findings. 23 Donohue and Ayres also
found coding errors in the Mustard-Lott model that, when corrected, eliminated the claimed
effect of concealed carry laws on robbery. 24 Meanwhile, Dan A. Black, an economist at the
University of Chicago, and Daniel S. Nagin, an economist at Carnegie Mellon University,
found that if the single state of Florida, where crime statistics were usually volatile, was
removed from the Lott-Mustard econometric model, all of the claimed effects of concealed
carry laws on violent crime disappeared. 25 A host of other researchers, including the most
prominent pro-gun criminologist, found serious problems with Lott and Mustard’s work.
The consensus was that conclusions could not reliably be drawn from the Lott-Mustard
econometric analysis. 26
The second problem with the “more guns, less crime” thesis is easier to grasp for those
of us untrained in econometric analysis, namely, the actual results of the expansion in
19

Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 6th ed. 2015), 68.
Justine E. Johnson-Makuch, Comment, “Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry: A Five-Circuit Shoot-Out, 83
Fordham Law Review 83:2757, 2758 (2015).
21
John J. Donohue, “The Impact of Concealed-Carry Law,” in Evaluating Gun Policy: Effects on Crime and
Violence (Jens Ludwig & Philip Cook, eds., New York: Oxford U. Press 2003), 289. The price of powdered cocaine
was falling sharply during the late 1980s, and by 1991 crack cocaine was found in of more than 60 percent of people
arrested in Manhattan. Franklin E. Zimring, The City That Became Safe: New York’s Lessons for Urban Crime and
its Control (New York: Oxford University Press 2012), 96-99.
22
Ibid. (original emphasis). See also Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue, “Shooting Down the ‘More Guns, Less Crime’
Hypothesis,” Stanford Law Review 55:1193 (2003).
23
Ian Ayres and John J. Donohue, “More Guns, Less Crime Fails Again: The Latest Evidence from 1977-2006,”
Econ Journal Watch 6:218 (2009).
24
Donohue, “The Impact of Concealed-Carry Law,” supra note 17, at 293.
25
Dan A. Black and Daniel A. Nagin, “Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Crime?” Journal of Legal Studies 27:209
(1998).
26
See generally David Hemenway, Private Guns, Public Health (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2004),
101-04.; Henigan, 130-31; Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 6th ed.
2015), 70-74. The pro-gun criminologist is Gary Kleck of Florida State University.
20
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concealed carry. For example, in September of 2013, one car tailgating another in Michigan
led to a road rage incident in which both drivers drove to a parking lot, got out of their cars,
pulled out handguns, and shot each other dead. 27 Both men had valid concealed carry
permits. Aside from the reciprocal-murder aspect, this incident was not unusual. The
Violence Policy Center (VPC) has been trying to track the number of people who were killed
by someone with a concealed carry permit since May of 2007. This is a difficult undertaking
because there is no official database of such killings. In fact, some states make it unlawful
for law enforcement to reveal such information. VPC must, therefore, rely principally on
news accounts, and its count includes only a fraction of the actual total. As of this writing,
VPC identified 921 people who were killed by concealed carry permit holders. 28 That
number includes homicides, suicides, and accidents but excludes the very small number of
shootings made in self-defense. These killings occurred in forty states and the District of
Columbia. Seventeen victims were law enforcement officers. The incidents include thirtyone mass shootings that took the lives of 147 victims. It is also worth noting that except for
suicides, where the lethality rate is very high with guns, there are many more shootings than
killings because some victims who are wounded survive.
One might think that the NRA would be satisfied with its enormous success in
persuading forty-three states to pass shall issue laws or otherwise liberally allow the carrying
of concealed handguns. 29 Not so. It is currently lobbying for passage of federal legislation
known as the Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017. 30 This was one of the first bills
introduced in the 115th Congress, and presently has 132 cosponsors. It would require every
state to honor a concealed carry permit issued by another state, even if that state does not
allow concealed carry by its own citizens.

III.
Let us next turn to mass shootings. Although mass shootings are not responsible for
the largest share of gun carnage in America – casualties from more prosaic shootings
involving one or a few victims far exceed those from mass shootings – mass shootings
receive a great deal of news coverage and are especially terrorizing.
We can begin on August 1, 1966, the day that an engineering student and former U.S.
Marine named Charles Whitman killed his wife and mother, and then, armed with rifles
and other guns, climbed to the top of The Tower at the center of campus of the University
of Texas at Austin, and from that perch shot students and others traversing the campus.
Before he was killed by Austin police, Whitman murdered a total of eighteen people and
wounded thirty-two more. 31 I have vivid memories of that event. I was then eighteen27

Johnson-Makuch, 2758.
This was the count as of January 13, 2017. Violence Policy Center, “Concealed Carry Killers,” available at
http://concealedcarrykillers.org.
29
According to the NRA, only seven states – California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New Jersey, New York – deny concealed carry to most citizens. See https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws.aspx.
30
H.R. 38, 115th Congress (2017-18). See https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/housebill/38?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Concealed+Carry+Reciprocity+Act+of+2017%22%5D%7D&r=1
31
I include Whitman’s wife and mother, whom he killed earlier that morning, and three individuals he killed in The
Tower. It does not include Whitman himself.
28
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years-old and going off to college in a month. You might think the Whitman massacre
would have made someone like me and my family anxious, but I don’t remember it
creating anxiety. This was then the worst shooting massacre in the U.S. history. 32 Mass
shootings before this time were, in fact, rare in America. 33 The entire nation was stunned
and horrified, of course, but we assumed that it was a bizarre event, an anomaly. No one
realized that Charles Whitman was the harbinger of a new normal.
Here is an abbreviated list of some of the more memorable mass shootings:
McDonald’s, San Ysidro, CA
Cleveland Elementary School, Stockton CA
Luby’s Cafeteria, Killen TX
Columbine High School, Littleton CO
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg VA
Safeway Parking Lot, Tucson, AZ
Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newton CT
Inland Regional Center, San Bernadino CA
Emanuel A.M.E. Church, Charleston SC
Pulse Nightclub, Orlando FL
Las Vegas, NV
Sutherland Springs, TX

1984
1989
1991
1999
2007
2011
2012
2015
2015
2016
2017
2017

22 dead, 19 wounded
6 dead, 30 wounded
24 dead, 20 wounded
15 dead, 23 wounded
33 dead, 17 wounded
6 dead, 13 wounded
28 dead
14 dead, 14 wounded
9 dead
50 dead, 53 wounded
59 dead, 441 wounded
26 dead, 20 wounded 34

There is plenty of national anxiety now. My wife and I work in different settings – she
in a government agency and I in a university – but we have both been required to undergo
active shooter training by our employers, and surely this has become routine nearly
everywhere. Americans feel very much at risk of finding themselves in a massacre. The
general feeling, I believe, is not only that no place is safe, but that eventually there will a
mass shooting just about everywhere. Because some of the worst massacres have occurred
in elementary schools, even small children are not spared from worry. Reminders of
vulnerability are ever-present. My university, for example, has just installed on all classroom
doors fancy new locks with a red button on the inside side of the door that, when depressed,
locks the door without need of a key. No one has explained why the new locks have been
installed – no one needs to – and those red buttons will remind us constantly of potential
threat. In case you are wondering, to the best of my knowledge no shooting has occurred at
my university, though there was concern when a former student sent obliquely menacing
emails to a dean and several faculty members (including me), and then refused to open his
apartment door to talk to police who came to have a chat with him, making it clear he was

32

See History News Network, The Deadliest Mass Killings in American History by a Single Shooter, June 17, 2016,
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/153325.
33
The impression that mass shootings were rare before 1966 is confirmed by criminologist Grant Duwe, who has
studied more than 1,300 mass shootings occurring from 1900 to 2013. See N.R. Kleinfield, et al., “Killers Fit a
Profile, but So Do Many Others,” New York Times, Oct. 14, 2015, 1.
34
Data for all entries except the last two were taken from Violence Policy Center, “High-Capacity Ammunition
Magazines are Common Thread Running Through Most Mass Shootings in the United States,”
http://www.vpc.org/fact_sht/VPCshootinglist.pdf. Data for the last two entries (Las Vegas and Sutherland Springs)
were taken from http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/mass-shooting?page=1.
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armed. No weapon was ever fired, but there was a standoff that lasted awhile, an arrest, and
after some weeks, a release. It feels part of a new normal.
There is no universally accepted definition of “mass shooting.” 35 How many victims
does it take to qualify as a mass shooting? Should we count the total number of casualties,
both killed and wounded, or just fatalities? Should shooters who die at the scene be included
in the number of fatalities? Researchers and news organizations use different definitions,
which often makes apple-to-apple comparisons difficult. Gun Violence Archive (GVA), an
organization that defines its mission as providing independent, verified data about gun
violence to researchers and the public-at-large through its website, defines mass shooting as
a single event resulting in four or more people being shot and/or killed, not including the
shooter. 36
Depending upon how one defines the term, mass shootings may now, on average, be
occurring at a rate of about one-a-day in the United States. The New York Times counted 358
mass shootings with four or more casualties (including killed and wounded) in 2015. GVA
counted 275 mass shootings in 2014 and 333 in 2015. At the time I happen to writing this,
Sunday morning, January 22, 2017, GVA has already counted twenty mass shootings this
year.
Near the end of 2015, the Washington Post looked at mass shootings in the United States
over the past fifty years. 37 For this purpose, it defined mass shooting as an event in which
four or more people were killed. It excluded gang killings and killings stemming from other
crimes such as robberies but included the perpetrator in the number of fatalities. The Post
identified 124 such events, in which a total of 814 people were killed, for an average of seven
fatalities per event. These mass shootings occurred in forty states. With only three
exceptions, all of the shooters were male. The most common venues for the massacres were,
in declining order, workplaces, retail stores and restaurants, and schools. Shooters brought
an average of three guns apiece to each shooting, for a total of 243 guns in all incidents.
Most of the weapons were handguns. It was possible to determine how the shooters acquired
180 of the guns used, and of those 141 – 78.3 percent – were acquired legally. We also know
that most mass shooters kill a former or current intimate partner, often at the beginning of
their rampage. 38
Can we create a system that will keep guns out of the hands of potential mass shooters
while still allowing them to trustworthy individuals? The conventional wisdom is that mass
shooters suffer from serious mental illnesses, and that we might be able to drastically reduce
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these events by making improvements in the mental health system. 39 However, according to
Michael Stone, a forensic psychiatrist at Columbia University, only twenty percent of mass
shooters are suffering from serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, delusions, or
psychoses. 40 The rest of them may have personality or sociopathic disorders, and while they
may be exhibit rage, an extreme lack of empathy, humiliation, or paranoia, they know what
they are doing. According to Stone, this second group can neither be reliably identified nor
helped by the mental health system, no matter how well it is improved. Other researchers
agree. James Alan Fox, a criminologist at Northeastern University, says that most mass
killers are depressed, not delusional. 41 A group of three psychiatrists, a social worker
specializing in mental health, and a sociologist-economist specializing in gun violence who
together studied gun violence and mental health note that epidemiological research shows
that people with mental illness are responsible for only a small proportion of violence in
America. They go on to write:
The very small proportion of people with mental illnesses who are inclined to be
dangerous often do not seek treatment before they do something harmful; they
therefore do not acquire a gun-disqualifying record of mental health adjudication
(or criminal record, either) that would show up in a background check.
Psychiatrists, using clinical judgment, cannot accurately foresee which patients will
be violent. 42
Mass murderers, of course, are not the average guys. Experts tell us mass murderers are
often socially isolated. They don’t fit in and often come from communities where fitting is
considered very important. They are often frustrated and externalize blame, says James Alan
Fox. “Nothing is ever their fault….They see themselves as good guys mistreated by
others.” 43 Those who commit family massacres, says Fox, are typically “vengeful” but not
mentally ill. 44 But risk factors such as anger, frustration, alienation, and even some degree
of paranoia are not useful in identifying people who should be denied firearms. Those
characteristics are all too common.
While it might be possible to develop an algorithm to assess an individual’s risk to
become violent, such a tool is unlikely to be useful for regulatory purposes. Many studies
have, for example, found that alcohol abuse is a major risk factor for all types of gun
violence. 45 We know other factors such as gender, age, impulsivity, and lack of family
support are stronger predictors of violent behavior than is mental illness. John Monahan, a
psychologist at the University of Virginia, developed a software program that uses 106 risk
factors to predict the potential for violence for patients being discharged from psychiatric
hospital units. 46 The model shows promise: only ten percent of those who were deemed low39

Sixty-three percent of Americans blame mass shootings on failings in the mental health system. See Michael S.
Rosenwald, “Most mass shooters aren’t mentally ill,” Washington Post, May 19, 2016, A1.
40
Ibid.
41
See Kleinfield, et al. (quoting Fox).
42
Jeffrey W. Swanson, et al., “Preventing Gun Violence Involving People with Serious Mental Illness,” in Reducing
Gun Violence in America: Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds.,
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2013), 33, at 36.
43
See Kleinfield, et al., supra (quoting Fox).
44
Ibid.
45
David Brown, “No easy task to identify a mass killer,” Washington Post, Jan. 4, 2003, at A1.
46
Ibid.

11

risk committed a violent act over the next six months while 49 percent of those deemed highrisk did so. Nevertheless, such a model will have little utility for regulatory policy. It might
be helpful in determining whom to release from a mental-health facility, but it will never
stop people without criminal or mental-health records from purchasing guns. There is, first,
the practical problem of getting the data. Monahan acquired his information in extensive
interviews of patients prior to discharge, but how would the government learn that someone
in the general population sometimes has five drinks in a row or does not have good
relationships with family members? Second, there are legal barriers. The Supreme Court has
held that individuals possess a constitutional right to own handguns for self-defense. The
courts are likely to continue to allow a regulatory system that denies firearms to felons and
people who have been adjudicated a danger to themselves or others, but they are not going
to sanction algorithms of the kind Monahan has developed.
The good guy/bad guy model is widely accepted though generally unexamined. 47
Occasionally, however, those who examine the data and think hard about the issue realize
that it cannot work. There is a strong incentive not to reach this conclusion – not even to
consider it, in fact – because it leads to pessimism, even despair. But occasionally people
who examine the data and think hard about the options do realize the futility of the good
guy/bad guy model. In October 2016, the New York Times published an extensive
examination of the issue that began on the front page and took up two full interior pages.
Titled “In 130 of Worst Shootings, Vision of Porous Gun Laws,” the story contained this
observation:
[A]n examination of high-casualty shootings emphasizes not only how porous
existing firearm regulations are, but also how difficult tightening them in a
meaningful way can be.…The findings are dispiriting to anyone hoping for simple
legislative fixes to gun violence. In more than half the 130 cases, at least one
assailant was already barred by federal law from having a weapon, usually because
of a felony conviction, but nonetheless acquired a gun.…Of the remaining
assailants, 40 percent had never had a serious run-in with the law and probably
could have bought a gun even in states with the strictest firearm control. 48
The hard truth is that the possibility of reducing mass shootings by improving the mental
health system or the records used for background checks run into four implacable problems.
First, most perpetrators of gun violence do not suffer from serious mental illness. Second,
among the perpetrators of gun violence that do suffer from mental illness, few seek
treatment. Third, among people who do seek help for mental illness, psychiatrists and other
mental health professionals cannot distinguish between those who are dangerous and those
who are not. Fourth, people who have been identified as dangerous and barred from
purchasing a gun may prevail on someone who can pass a background check to serve as a
“straw purchaser,” that is, to purchase the gun for him. Police sting operations have shown
that some licensed gun dealers readily sell a gun to A even when they know all of the
following three things: A is serving as a straw purchaser for B, B is legally barred from
47
For example, Philip Cook and Kristin Goss, use the terms “good guys” and “bad guys” to describe the U.S. model
and recognize that other nations employ the other, more effective model, but nevertheless restrict themselves to
making proposals to improve the fatally-flawed model. Cook & Gross, 55, 118, and 214-20, respectively.
48
Sharon LaFraniere & Emily Palmer, “In 130 of Worst Shootings, Vision of Porous Gun Laws, New York Times,
Oct. 22, 2016, at A1.

12

purchasing a gun, and B intends to use the gun to commit a crime. 49 And, of course, there
are grossly irresponsible private, unlicensed sellers too. The two teenagers who committed
the Columbine High School massacre, and were a year too young to legally purchase long
guns, recruited an eighteen-year-old to purchase two shotguns and a semiautomatic rifle
from a private seller at a gun show for them. 50

IV.
We shall now more broadly examine gun violence in America.
There were, according to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 13,455 murders in the United
States in 2015. 51 The most commonly-used weapons were firearms; they accounted for 9,616
– 71.5 percent – of all murders in the U.S. And the most commonly-used type of firearm
were handguns. In fact, handguns were used to commit at least 6,447 murders – 67 percent
of all firearm homicides and 48 percent of all homicides. I say “at least” because we do not
know what type of firearm was used for 2,648 murders. We do know that long guns –
shotguns and rifles – were used to commit 521 murders, which represent less than four
percent of all homicides. If we assume the division between handguns and long guns for the
category “other guns or type not stated” in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports is in the same
proportion as when the type of firearm used was known and reported, then handguns
accounted for about 61 percent of all murders in the United States. The next most commonly
used weapons are knives or cutting instruments, which account for approximately 11 percent
of all murders in the U.S. That is followed by personal weapons (hands and feet) and blunt
objects, which, respectively, are used to commit roughly four percent and three percent of
all murders. Other weapons combined – including poison, explosives, being pushed or
thrown out of a window, and fire – account for well under one percent of all murders. This
has long been the U.S. pattern. 52 So handguns are, by far, the instruments most commonly
used to commit murder in the United States.
In what types of situations do handgun-related murders occur? According to the FBI,
about 17 percent of all handgun murders in 2015 occurred in connection with a felony or
suspected felony – such as robbery, rape, and narcotics violations – while about 23 percent
occurred during arguments or brawls. 53 These were followed by juvenile gang killings and
gangland killings, which, respectively, constituted about nine percent and two percent of
handgun-related homicides. Law enforcement did not know the circumstances in which
about 38 percent of all handgun-related murders were committed. For these purposes,
however, we cannot reasonably assume that the circumstances in the unknown category
mirror those in the known categories. Perhaps a higher proportion of murders that occurred
in unknown circumstances arose from robberies and other felonies than from arguments,
brawls, and romantic triangles than was the case when police were able to discern the
49
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circumstances of the killing. A reasonable guess might be that there is a roughly equal
division between handgun murders that occur during other crimes and those that arise out of
arguments, brawls, romantic triangles, and the like.
The FBI also reports that, among all of the 13,455 murders in 2015, 1,721 victims (12.8
percent) were family member of the perpetrator, 1,013 (7.5 percent) were a friend, boyfriend,
or – most commonly – a girlfriend of the perpetrator, and 2,801 (20.8 percent) were an
acquaintance of the perpetrator. 54 These three categories – relative, friend, and acquaintance
– are all somewhat larger than the numbers suggest because in many instances the police are
unable to identify the perpetrator. The rough rules of thumb used by criminologists and
sociologists familiar with these data is that in about half of homicides the perpetrator and
victim knew each other, about a quarter of all female victims are killed by husbands and
boyfriends, and about one-third of all homicides arise from arguments. 55
The largest category of gun violence is suicide. According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), there were 21,334 suicides by firearms in the United States
in 2014 (the latest year for which the CDC has supplied data). 56 While the CDC does not
report the type of firearm, handguns are almost always the type of firearm used, both because
they are more prevalent and because of the physical difficulty of using a long gun to shoot
oneself.
The smallest category of gun fatalities are accidents. About six-hundred people die
annually from unintentional shootings. 57 But while a relatively small category in terms of
the total number of fatalities, it is a poignant category nonetheless because it includes, on
average, 62 children age 14 or younger per year. 58 Many of these are quite young – children
who find a parent’s handgun in a nightstand drawer or under socks in a bedroom dresser and
accidently kill themselves, siblings, and playmates.
Of course, many shootings are not fatal. In 2010, hospital emergency rooms treated
73,505 nonfatal gunshot injuries. 59 These include gunshots resulting from murder attempts,
robberies, assaults, accidents, and suicide attempts. Firearms, therefore, impose a heavy
financial cost on the U.S. health care system. Firearms were also used to commit 123,358
robberies and 170,941 aggravated assaults in the U.S. during 2015. 60 That accounts for about
41 percent all robberies and nearly a quarter of all aggravated assaults. 61 Guns, therefore,
have an impact on American life that extends well beyond the numbers of people who are
killed and injured.
So far have we have been examining the cost side of the ledger. Let’s now turn to the
benefit side: how often handguns and other firearms are used in self-defense. This is a subject
54
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of hot debate. The NRA and its allies claim that guns are frequently used for self-defense
and prevent many crimes – most often by merely brandishing a gun and frightening a robber
or attacker away. That is a convenient claim because it largely relies on unverified stories
by gun owners. For example, a gun owner says that he heard someone attempting to break
into his home at night. He got his gun and shouted, “Come in at your own risk. I am armed!”
He then heard footsteps running away. Or a gun owner claims he was walking alone at night
when a menacing-looking individual crossed the street in his direction, apparently bent upon
robbery. The gun owner drew his previously-concealed handgun from its holster and
displayed it to the approaching individual, who promptly turned tail and ran away. Such
stories are legion. Even assuming good faith by a story-teller, how do we know whether he
was mistaken about the intent of the person he frightened away? To take a famous situation,
George Zimmerman may have been convinced in his mind that he was a law-abiding citizen
and Treyvon Martin was a dangerous criminal, yet things surely appeared quite different to
Treyvon Martin. In a study conducted by a researcher at the Harvard School of Public Health,
a panel of judges reviewed incidents in which gun owners said they fired a single shot in
self-defense. The judges concluded that in a majority of those incidents the action was not,
in fact, a legitimate act of self-defense. 62
We do, however, have hard data that can give us a better idea about how often guns are
used in self-defense, namely, the number of justifiable homicides in which handguns were
used. Unlike unverified stories about brandishing a gun, when someone is shot and killed
there is a dead body and a police investigation. According to the FBI, private handguns were
used in 215 justifiable homicides in 2015. 63 (Long guns were used in just 21 justifiable
homicides.) Justifiable homicides occur when someone reasonably believes it is necessary
to use deadly force in defense of himself or someone else. Of course, not every use of
handgun for self-defense results in a fatality. It is reasonable to assume that the rule of thumb
that there are five to seven non-fatal injuries for every fatal gun injury applies. 64 And there
are surely occasions when merely brandishing a weapon is, by itself, an effective mode of
self-defense. Nevertheless, comparing the number of justifiable handgun homicides to
handgun murders is extremely useful in making a cost-benefit analysis of handguns in
America. To repeat the figures, there were 215 justifiable homicides and 6,447 murders
committed with handguns in 2015. Thus, 96.8 percent of all of the killings committed with
handguns were murders. This is, of course, not the whole story; but it gives us a solid appleto-apple comparison.
Also on the benefit side of the ledger are the feelings of security that handguns give
their owners. It must be noted, however, that as comforting as those feelings may be, they
provide gun owners with a false sense of security. Most Americans who own handguns do
so for self-defense. Undoubtedly, they believe they are making a prudent decision to protect
themselves and their families, but data suggest otherwise. Another study has shown that for
each incident in which a gun in the home was used to shoot an intruder, there are four
accidental shootings of members of their households or their guests, seven criminal assaults
or homicides, and eleven attempted or completed suicides. 65 Having a gun at home increases
62
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the chance of successful suicide in that home by a factor of five. 66 Teenagers are especially
at risk. Many teens go through periods of angst and depression, and a gun is all too easy to
grab and use in a moment of even brief despair. Moreover, once the trigger is pulled, there
is no turning back as sometimes happens when someone swallows pills or sits in a running
automobile in a closed garage.
The gun lobby has long argued that guns in the home deter home invasions or “hot
burglaries,” i.e., burglaries occurring when homeowners are present. The theory is that
burglars do not want to be confronted by armed homeowners. Thus, burglars seek to avoid
neighborhoods where they believe there are a higher proportion of armed homeowners, work
harder to ensure the home is unoccupied before burglarizing it, or are more likely to take up
other lines of work in states and regions with high rates of gun ownership. The theory may
be superficially appealing, but it is not supported by the data. First, guns in the home are
rarely used against intruders. In one study, researchers working with the police found that in
only three out of 198 instances (1.5%) of unwanted home entries that occurred in Atlanta
over a three-month period were handguns used in self-defense. 67
Second, according
to one study, hot burglary rates increase rather than decrease along with the prevalence of
gun ownership. 68 A ten-percent increase in gun ownership appeared to increase burglary
rates by three to seven percent.
I suspect that even if gun owners knew all of these data, many would nonetheless feel
confident that owning a handgun is a prudent decision for them and their families. Tragedies
happen to less careful people. Just as ninety percent of all drivers believe they are better than
average, most gun owners must surely believe that they are more trustworthy than the
average gun owner. 69 Jamie Gilt, a 31-year-old gun activist in Jacksonville, Florida, may
have been just such a person. Jamie maintained a Facebook page titled “Jamie Gilt for Gun
Sense,” on which she ridiculed the idea of relying on the police for protection instead of
owing a gun. 70 Her whole family knew how to shoot, Jamie noted, adding, “Even my 4-yearold gets jacked up to target shoot the .22.” On Monday, March 7, 2016, while Jamie was
driving a pickup truck, her four-year-old son who was sitting in the backseat accidentally
shot Jamie with a handgun. The bullet entered Jamie’s back and exited the front of her torso.
A police officer quickly came to the rescue when he observed Jamie behaving frantically
inside the truck. Fortunately, Jamie survived.

V.
We shall now examine the existing system of firearm regulation in the United States.
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Federal law requires that people wishing to purchase a firearm – handgun, rife, or
shotgun – from licensed gun dealer fill out a Firearms Transaction Form and have their
names run through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), which
is operated by the FBI. In the main, the system is designed to prevent sales to people who
have been convicted of a felony; people who have been convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanor or are under a restraining order; people adjudicated to be “a mental defective”
or involuntarily committed to a mental institution; drug addicts; aliens unlawfully in the
U.S.; fugitives from justice; and people dishonorably discharged from the armed forces. 71 In
the good guy/bad guy model, these are the bad guys. Everyone else over 18 years of age may
purchase a long gun, and those 21 or older may purchase a handgun. Under federal law,
background checks must be completed within three days although nearly all checks are
completed within just seconds. There are some additional state restrictions – most notably,
about a dozen states require a license or permit to own a handgun. 72
For political reasons, the system has enormous loopholes. Most significantly, only sales
by licensed gun dealers are covered. Private sales are exempt under federal law. These
include, notoriously, sales made by private sellers at the 4,000 gun shows that are held
annually across the country. Private sellers constitute between a quarter and a half of all gun
sellers at gun shows. 73 No one really knows what portion of all firearm sales are private and
therefore take place without background checks. According to a rather old survey, 40 percent
of all gun sales are private. In a more recent survey of prison inmates who used a gun in their
most recent crime, only one in nine (11%) said they bought the gun from a store or a
pawnshop, which are general the venues licensed gun dealers. Only sixteen states require
background checks for private handgun sales, and only six states require background checks
for private sales of all firearms, including long guns. 74
Another strange aspect of federal law is that all federal records background check
records, including the Firearm Transaction Form filled out and signed by the purchaser, must
be destroyed within twenty-four hours of a completed gun sale. 75 The reason for the
requirement is that the NRA is adamantly opposed to any records of gun ownership so that,
should the government fall into tyrannical hands, it would not have records to aid it in gun
confiscation. 76 However, destroying these records makes it all but impossible to prosecute
purchasers who lie on those forms in order to buy guns.
Moreover, federal firearm laws have been deliberately designed to make research about
gun regulation in the United States by criminologists, public health experts, and others more
difficult. In 1995, Congress directed that $2.6 million that had been budgeted for gun-related
research by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) be used instead for other
purposes, and it has since repeatedly instructed that no CDC research money may be “used
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to advocate or promote gun control.” 77 Note that Congress’ direction was not evenhanded;
it did not say, for example, that CDC funds could not be used to advocate for or against gun
control, or to promote any position regarding gun control. Not only CDC but researchers
based at universities who routinely obtain federal grants to study crime or public health
issues got the message: stop doing research related to firearms or risk forfeiting federal
research grants of all kinds. This effectively stopped federally-sponsored gun research for
more than a decade.
In 2009, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) began to make small but regular
research grants related to guns. At the behest of the NRA, Congress also passed legislation
designed to foreclose another promising area of research related to ATF traces of guns used
in crimes. When police recover a gun at a crime scene, ATF initiates a trace, using the
weapon’s serial number, to follow the gun from manufacturer, to distributor, to dealer, to the
person who purchased the gun from the dealer. Using trace data, researchers discovered that
a disproportionate number of crime guns were being sold by a relatively few gun shops. In
fact, the data were astonishing: one percent of licensed gun dealers were selling nearly 60
percent of the guns ultimately used in crimes. 78 This presented a new area of inquiry: could
gun crimes be reduced by eliminating “bad apple” dealers or otherwise improving the
distribution chain? Continuing its three-monkey approach – see no evil, hear no evil, speak
no evil – Congress, in 2003, enacted legislation that effectively prohibits ATF from
disclosing trace data, even non-individual aggregated data, to the public. 79
The NRA, and thus Congress, wants as weak and ineffective an ATF as possible.
Congress expressly prohibits AFT from conducting more than one unannounced visit of a
gun dealer per year – no matter how questionable the history of the dealer – and the funding
that Congress provides is barely sufficient to allow ATF to visit a gun dealer, on average,
every five years. 80 Congress forbids ATF from computerizing trace data; all traces have to
be conducted by hand. And Congress prohibits ATF from requiring that dealers maintain an
inventory, which, of course, makes it difficult or impossible for ATF to tell whether a
dealer’s guns are being stolen, lost, or deliberately diverted to the black market.
Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that the loopholes could be closed and the
political obstacles removed. Suppose the law required that all gun sales in all states – whether
made by licensed dealers or private sellers * – were subject to NICS background checks?
Suppose the ATF were adequately funded and permitted to inspect dealers as reasonably
necessary to ensure, as much as possible, compliance with law. Suppose record reporting
were improved to ensure, as much as possible, that relevant criminal and mental health
records were timely entered into the system. If it were improved as much as possible, would
the basic regulatory model we have be adequate to reasonably protect America from gun
violence?
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The answer is no. Even with a perfect record system covering all gun sales, the good
guy/bad guy model will not do the job. Let’s start with the criminal side. Only 40 percent of
people convicted of murder had prior felony records. 81 Moreover, even if we require that all
private sales be subject to background checks, people with felony records will still borrow
guns from friends and family members, steal guns, and purchase them on the black market.
When surveyed, only 20 percent of prisoners say they purchased the gun they used for the
last crime from a store. 82 Things are even bleaker on the mental health side. As previously
mentioned, only a small fraction of people who commit murder are mentally ill. There are
some serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and severe depression
that are associated with increased risks of violent behavior, but one study found that only
seven percent of people who were hospitalized for these conditions were hospitalized
involuntarily, and, under current federal law, only that subgroup is ineligible to purchase or
own a firearm. 83 Even if the NICS records and federal law were to be expanded broadly to
prohibit everyone suffering from a severe mental illness from owning a gun – regardless of
whether they were hospitalized involuntarily, or even hospitalized at all – the records will
still be woefully over-inclusive and under-inclusive. On the one hand, only a fraction of
people with serious mental illness will ever wind up in the NICS; and on the other hand the
vast majority of people will serious mental illnesses are not violent. Moreover, it is estimated
that only five percent of violent crimes are committed by people with serious mental
illness. 84 (At present, we are making it easier for mentally ill people to buy guns. At the
NRA’s behest, Congress passed and President Donald J. Trump signed legislation abolishing
a federal regulation that required the Social Security Administration to report to the NICS
people who receive disability checks because they are mentally disabled or unable to handle
their own financial affairs. 85)
Currently, most states require psychotherapists to report patients who present a serious
danger of violence to an identifiable individual. 86 This generally means that a
psychotherapist must report a patient who expressly says he intends to harm a specific
person. A few states require psychotherapists to also report individuals who they believe
present a serious danger to society at large, regardless of whether they have said they want
81
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to harm a particular individual. Either way, this is very different than reporting all patients
with serious mental illness. Requiring psychotherapists to report to the government everyone
with a serious mental illness who comes to them for help, regardless of whether the
psychotherapist has reason to believe the particular patient is dangerous, would likely to do
more far harm than good. It would discourage people from seeking treatment, and it would
weaken the patients’ trust in their relationships with their psychotherapists, which are
essential to successful treatment. Discouraging people with serious mental illnesses from
getting treatment is hardly a recipe for improving public health and safety.
Scientists have begun to identify genes that are associated with violent behavior.87
Suppose, for the sake of argument, they get much better at this – so much better that a DNA
test can identify people who are likely to commit violent acts in the future. Should such
individuals be prohibited from buying or possessing a firearm, even if they have not yet
committed a violent act? In view of the fact that the Supreme Court has held that people
have a constitutional right to own handguns, it would, a matter of law, be extremely difficult
to deny that right to people who have, to date, been law-abiding citizens. If we can deny
them that constitutional right, is not the next logical step preventive detention? 88
Thus, for a host of reasons – involving law, public policy, fundamental American
values, medical ethics, sociology, and much more – the good guy/bad guy model is never
going to be adequate to the task, even if it is improved as much as practicably possible. It
should be no surprise, therefore, that the best evidence is that gun control measures based on
that system have been ineffective.
The statutory genesis of our current federal system was the Brady Handgun Prevention
Act of 1994. That law imposed a five-day waiting period for handgun purchases. The
purpose was two-fold: (1) to provide a cooling-off period for people who may be purchasing
handguns because they were angry at someone and intending harm, and (2) to have local
police conduct a background check of putative handgun purchasers during the waiting
period. 89 When the law went into effect, 18 states already had similar laws in place. This set
up something of a natural experiment to measure the efficacy of the Brady Act. Crime rises
and falls for a many reasons, so just seeing whether homicide rates increased or declined
after the law went into effect would not tell us much. A crime decrease may have happened
anyway. However, researchers were able to compare the 32 states with new waiting periods
and background checks with the 18 states that already had such requirements to see whether
there were greater changes in one group of states than the other. They discovered that the
average homicide rates in both groups followed nearly exactly the same trajectories. 90 There
was no discernable impact of the Brady Act on crime rates.
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Further research has confirmed that the Brady Act has no discernable effect on reducing
criminal violence by purchasers who were blocked from purchasing a gun because of their
previous criminal histories. Researchers found evidence that the Act might have had “some
positive effect” among purchasers who were disqualified exclusively by their mental health
histories, that is, people with serious mental illness and without criminal records. 91 But that
is a pretty small subgroup. In the study, it comprised only five percent of the people blocked
from purchasing a gun.
The fact that the Brady Act is not associated with a decline in homicides often surprises
gun control advocates. On its website, the Brady Campaign to Prevent Handgun Violence,
which was the principal advocate for the Brady Act, makes the following claim: “Since the
Brady law took effect in 1994, over 2.4 million prohibited purchases have been blocked and
countless lives have been saved.” 92 It is true that 2.4 million sales by licensed gun dealers
were blocked because purchasers were determined to be ineligible to purchase a gun, but it
is, I believe, nothing more than an assumption that the blocked sales saved lives – at least as
a result of homicides, robberies, and criminal assault. That is why, I suspect, the Brady
Campaign says that “countless” lives were saved, without any supporting citation. The most
obvious explanation as to why blocked sales do not appear to translate into saved lives is
that buyers turned away by licensed dealers get guns elsewhere. While we do not know how
often such buyers are redirected to private sellers or the black market, there is plenty of
anecdotal evidence of people shopping at guns shows being turned away by licensed dealers
and immediately going to unlicensed dealers at adjacent tables. 93
This does not mean, however, that effective gun control is impossible. Other nations
have it. They have reduced firearm homicides to a tiny fraction of what we experience in the
United States, and as a result their total homicides rates are also much lower than ours. I do
not say “as a result” blithely, but before speaking of cause and effect let’s look at some data.
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In the chart above, the first bar for each nation is the firearm homicide rate, the second
bar is the non-firearm homicide rate, and the third bar is the total homicide rate. 94 The first
bar for the United Kingdom is not missing; you cannot see it because the firearm homicide
rate was zero. The firearm death rate for the United States towers above the other three
countries: the U.S. rate is more than seven times the next highest rate. By contrast, the nonfirearm homicide rate in the United States of is not even twice the Canadian rate. As one can
clearly see, that towering third bar of total homicides in the United States is comprised, in
the main, of the first bar – homicides with guns.
Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have convincingly demonstrated that the
United States is not exceptional because Americans are more violent than citizens in other
affluent countries. Rates of robberies and assaults in America are not far different than in
other affluent nations. For example, during their study period the assault rates for Canada
and England were within 30 percent of the U.S. rate, while the assault rate in Austria was a
bit more than 30 percent above the U.S. rate. What makes America so different is its
extraordinarily high rate of lethal violence, and what makes violence in America lethal so
much more often is its much higher prevalence of guns. Guns are, quite simply, far more
lethal than other weapons. The robbery rates in Canada, England, and Australia were, for the
year studied, within 30 percent of the U.S. rate. 95 Robberies, however, are more likely to
turn deadly when they are at gun point. It is so much easier to shoot a victim who resists, or
flees, or whom the robber just does not like than it is to stab or bludgeon him, and someone
who is shot is more likely to die than someone who is stabbed or bludgeoned. Guns are used
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in in about 40 percent of New York robberies yet accounted for 85 percent of robbery
killings. 96 The same dynamic plays out in assaults. 97 Guns are used in 26 percent of assaults
in New York but only one percent of assaults in London. 98 Consider that last statistic, and
then look again at the bars depicting the homicide rates in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
Zimring and Hawkins compared crime in Los Angeles, California with crime in Sydney,
Australia, and crime in New York City with crime in London, England. 99 Los Angeles and
Sydney both had populations of 3.6 million during the study period, and they had roughly
similar rates of theft and burglary. And yet, Sydney’s robbery rate was only 12.5 percent of
that of Los Angeles, and its homicide rate was only 4.8 percent of that of Los Angeles. Thus,
as Zimring and Hawkins put it, “for every homicide reported in Sydney, twenty bodies are
added to the count in Los Angeles.” 100 During the study period, New York City’s population
was seven million and London’s was 6.6 million. London’s theft and burglary rates were,
respectively, 166.5 percent and 157 percent of New York’s. However, London’s robbery
rate was 19.4 percent of New York’s rate, and its homicide rate was only 8.9 percent of New
York’s rate. Thus, even though London’s burglary and theft rates were higher than New
York’s rates, New York’s robbery rate was five times London’s, and New York’s murder
was more than eleven times London’s rate.
One famous study by other researchers examined crime over a seven-year period in both
Seattle, Washington and Vancouver, British Columbia. 101 During the study period, these two
cities – located 140 miles apart – were nearly identical in population size, unemployment
rate, and median household income. They had strong cultural similarities as well; for
example, a majority of the top-ten rated television shows were the same in both cities. As
one might expect of twin cities, the burglary rates in Seattle and Vancouver were nearly
identical. The aggravated assault rate was slightly higher in Seattle, but when researchers
examined that more closely they found something quite interesting. The aggravated assault
rates with knives were almost identical. So were the aggravated assault rates with all other
weapons besides firearms. However, Seattle’s rate of aggravated assaults with firearms was
nearly eight times Vancouver’s rate. The murder rates between the cities were very different.
In fact, there were nearly twice as many murder in Seattle than in Vancouver over the study
period. The pattern here was much the same: the murder rates with knives, and with all other
weapons other than firearms, were quite close, but Seattle’s homicide firearm rate was nearly
five times Vancouver’s rate. The most salient difference between the two cities was the
prevalence of handguns: 41 percent of Seattle households handguns compared to 12 percent
of Vancouver households.
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More than anything else, the prevalence of guns that accounts for the disjunction
between the relative similarity in non-lethal crimes and the yawning chasm in lethal crimes
when comparing the United States to other affluent nations. Other international comparisons
have found that major gun laws reduce homicides while modest regulations do not.102 And
researchers have discovered that, within the United States, residents of states with higher
gun prevalence are more likely to be murdered than residents of states with lower gun
prevalence. 103 Indeed, residents of states with the very highest gun prevalence (Louisiana,
Alabama, Mississippi, Wyoming, West Virginia, and Arkansas) are 2.5 times more likely to
be homicide victims than are residents of states with the very lowest gun prevalence (Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Jersey). 104
“No program for the prevention of lethal violence can possess even superficial
credibility without paying sustained attention to guns,” wrote Zimring and Hawkins. 105 “The
basic choice,” they continued, “is between trying to deny handguns to only high-risk groups
and attempting to curtail the availability of handguns generally.” 106 That is, the U.S. follows
the good guy/bad guy model, which allows everyone except those in prohibited categories
to own firearms while other high-income nations allow only people in certain special
categories to own firearms. Zimring and Hawkins recognized that the choice is either to
bring “U.S. handgun policy to the standard of the rest of the developed world” or be content
with making “minor adjustments to current regulations that will all but guarantee persisting
high rates of death.” 107 It was, they observed, an “unpalatable” choice – unpalatable for
reasons of public opinion and politics.
Since they made that observation, the option of joining the rest of the world seems even
more unrealistic. Constitutional law has become as a second obstacle. It is entirely
understandable that gun control advocacy groups today try to content themselves with
fighting off ever more radical proposals by the gun lobby – such as requiring states to honor
concealed weapon permits issued by other states, or making gun silencers legal 108 – or
seeking modifications in the existing good guy/bad guy model. And yet, as I shall explain
shortly, that strategy is counterproductive because it accepts and entrenches the good
guy/bad guy model. I am not arguing that we can overthrow the good guy/bad guy model
and join the rest of the developed world soon. Rather, I shall argue that we must take a longterm view. Neither public opinion nor constitutional law is unalterable. Both can be changed
through concerted and sustained effort.
It was, not that long ago, settled constitutional law that the Second Amendment only
grants the people a right to keep and bear arms only within the government-regulated militia.
The higher federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, had consistently so
held throughout American jurisprudential history, and all legal commentators agreed. And
yet, beginning in the 1970s, the NRA and its allies launched a campaign to change that basic
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understanding. They knew this was not an easy task; they knew it would take sustained effort
over considerable time. I have told some of the story elsewhere. 109 Suffice it to say here that
they proceeded incrementally, gained momentum slowly but continuously, and succeeded
with a dramatic reversal of Supreme Court precedent. It took almost thirty years. Had they
contented themselves with easier but less consequential short-term projects, Second
Amendment jurisprudence would never have changed.
Can Second Amendment jurisprudence be changed again? If America is someday to
have a rational public policy and reasonable public safety, it must be changed. Moreover, it
can be changed without constitutional amendment because the historical background to the
Second Amendment demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller – the fiveto- four decision that reversed two centuries of precedent – was wrong. I shall next try to
give you just a flavor of that history.

VI.
Almost exactly one-hundred years before James Madison and the First Congress drafted
the Second Amendment, the English Parliament included a right-to-possess-arms provision
in its Bill of Rights of 1689. Although the English and American provisions are not identical,
they were written to deal with parallel problems, namely, competing governmental
authorities. Both were fundamentally separation of powers provisions. In England, the
question was whether Parliament had the sole right to regulate guns, or whether the King
could dispense with those laws; in America, it was whether the states had some minimum
right to armed militia even though the newly-adopted Constitution gave Congress the sole
authority to organize and arm the militia.
The English provision arose out of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The genesis of the
revolution was the ascension to the throne of King James II. 110 That set England’s teeth on
edge. Some years earlier, Parliament had enacted the Test Acts, which required that all
political and military officials take an oath renouncing any belief in Catholicism. 111 James,
who was the brother of then-ruling King Charles II, shocked the nation by refusing to take
the oath and instead resigning his position as Lord High Admiral. When Charles II died
unexpectedly in 1685 without an heir, he was succeeded by James II.
Although historians estimate that England’s Catholic population was only between two
and ten percent at the time, Protestant England nonetheless feared an attempt to restore the
nation to Catholicism, whether by invasion or subversion. That is why Parliament enacted
the Test Acts in the first place. James began ignoring the Test Acts by appointing Catholic
army officers. While the King could “dispense” with the law under certain circumstances,
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many considered this an abuse of that authority. There was fear that James intended to disarm
Protestants and arm Catholics by replacing Protestant military officers with Catholics, as
James’ friend, the Earl of Tryronnel, was doing in Ireland. James, however, was fifty-five,
then an advanced age, and neither hale nor hearty. His second wife was also Catholic, but
she was believed to be infertile. Next in line to the throne was James’ daughter Mary. There
was no problem there. Mary’s deceased mother, James’ first wife, had been a Protestant, and
Mary’s husband – William of Orange, the Stadtholder of Holland – was the principal
defender of Protestantism on the Continent. The hope, therefore, was that the danger posed
by James II would be a fleeting one.
That hope was dashed in June of 1688 when the Queen gave birth to a baby boy, who
by virtue of his gender became first in line to the throne. The prospect of a line of Catholic
kings was intolerable. Precipitating what is known as the Glorious Revolution, leaders of
Parliament invited William of Orange to invade England. William accepted the invitation.
James II, finding himself with no support – political or military – in the face of Williams’
advancing army, fled to France.
Parliament then negotiated the terms under which it would offer William the throne. 112
It presented William with a Declaration of Rights, and asked him to accept it as a condition
of being made King of England. Parliament wanted assurances that its lawmaking authority
would be recognized and not curtailed. For example, the Declaration accused James II of
“assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the
execution of laws without consent of Parliament,” and provided that “the pretended power
of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal authority, as it hath been assumed
and exercised of late, is illegal.” 113 Most relevant for our purposes, the Declaration accused
James II of “causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time
when papists were both armed and employed contrary to law.” Article VII of the Declaration
provided that “the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable
to their conditions and as allowed by law.” ∗ William accepted the Declaration, but insisted
that he rule as King and not merely as Mary’s consort. Parliament agreed that William and
Mary would be joint sovereigns but that William would administer the kingdom. When, ten
months later, Parliament formally enacted the Declaration by statute, and it became the
English Bill of Rights of 1689.
The right-to-have-arms provision of the Bill of Rights was not designed to grant the
people a right to have weapons regardless of what Parliament might decide. It was precisely
the opposite: it reaffirmed that firearm ownership was regulated by law, and that Parliament
made the laws. Moreover, Parliament had long and vigorously regulated gun ownership and
use in England. It had, for example, always restricted ownership of guns to the wealthy. In
1523, Parliament made it unlawful for anyone with an annual income of less than 100£ – a
considerable income at the time – to own a gun, a restriction that remained in place in 1689
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and well beyond. 114 Crossbows were similarly regulated. One of the reasons for allowing the
wealthy to own handguns was that military officers were drawn from the aristocracy.
(Proposals that officers should instead be appointed on the basis of competency or merit
were repeatedly rejected. This lasted through World War I and even to some extent into
World War II, when the aristocracy still provided a majority of military officers. The view
was that a “British military officer should be a gentleman first and an officer second.” 115) It
was sensible that military officers be familiar with the handguns, which were their principal
weapon, and the view, no doubt, was that gentlemen could be trusted with handguns. The
gun laws were supplemented with game laws that made it unlawful for anyone except those
meeting real property qualifications to either possess or use a gun for hunting. The game
laws were designed to restrict hunting to the landed gentry – or, as one modern historian
cleverly put it, the game laws “protected pheasants from peasants.” 116 The laws regulating
arms – guns and crossbows – were, of course, public safety measures.
It is quite interesting that even as early as the sixteenth century Parliament distinguished
between what we today think of as handguns – that is, a gun small enough to conceal on
one’s person – and longer guns, and between urban and rural areas. In 1541, Parliament
noted that “little shorte handguns and little hagbuttes” were responsible for “destestable and
shameful murders, robberies, felonies, riot and route,” and prohibited the possession of guns
shorter than one yard in length. Residents living outside of urban areas were allowed to own
guns of the prescribed length to protect their households, and residents living near the
seacoast or the Scottish border were also permitted to own guns as a defense against
invasion. 117 Residents in urban areas with annual incomes of more than 10£ were required
to own weapons to help provide for the national defense and public order, but they were
required to keep those weapons in public storage facilities. 118
Both the gun laws and the hunting laws were, of course, modified from time to time.
The central point is this: Parliament vigorously regulated arms. There was no tradition of
granting all subjects a right to own guns. Historian Lois Schwoerer writes:
A striking feature of England’s early modern gun culture was its restrictive nature:
English subjects whose socioeconomic standing was below a certain level (usually
an annual income of £100) were legally disallowed to possess or use a firearm. This
limit affected about 98 percent of the population. 119
And Parliament wanted the King to acknowledge that it – that is, Parliament, as the lawmaking body of the nation – had the sole authority to decide how arms were to be regulated.
Prior to James II, there had been at least one previous episode of a king exercising his
claimed dispensing power regarding Parliament’s gun laws. In 1544, while England was at
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war with both Scotland and France, King Henry VII proclaimed that all native-born subjects
could possess guns, notwithstanding any statute to the contrary. 120 But that was during war,
and it was brief; two years later the King rescinded that proclamation. James II’s program
of disarming Protestants and arming Catholics was another matter entirely. Article VII was
not intended to curtail gun regulation but to specify which branch of government had the
authority to regulate guns. Its most salient phrase was as allowed by law, which meant that
possession and use of arms was entirely contingent upon parliamentary regulation. The main
point was to have the King accept that phrase. 121
The American Founders were well aware of the English Bill of Rights, and it should not
be a surprise that the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution was also a
separation of powers provision. The new Constitution adopted by the Founders in
Philadelphia on September 17, 1787 radically changed governmental authority over the
militia. Previously, the militia had been creatures of the states. The Constitution changed
that. It placed the militia under the joint control of the federal and state governments, but it
gave the lion’s share of power to the federal government. Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of
the Constitution gave Congress the power:
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
That meant that Congress could organize and govern the militia as it saw fit. Congress was
also empowered to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union and to suppress
insurrections and repel invasions. The states were left with only the power to appoint officers
and to train the militia, although it had to train the militia as Congress would prescribe.
Congress, moreover, was not required to rely principally on the militia for national defense.
Although it had been a topic of some controversy in Philadelphia, the Constitution ultimately
gave Congress the power to maintain standing armies and a navy. Congress was therefore
free to decide to what extent it wanted to maintain a citizen militia.
I have told the remarkable story what of happened next at length elsewhere, 122 and will
give only a snapshot description here. When James Madison sought to have his home state
of Virginia ratify the new Constitution at a convention in Richmond, Virginia in June of
1788, his Antifederalist opponents – led by Patrick Henry and George Mason – accused him
120
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of creating a militia clause that presented grave dangers for Virginia and the South. The
Antifederalists accepted the representation that the Constitution did not give Congress the
power to eliminate slavery – not directly, that is. But, they argued, the Constitution gave
Congress the power to undermine the slave system by disarming the state militia, on which
the South relied for slave control. Only Congress was empowered to arm the militia, they
argued, and thus Congress could effectively disarm the militia. As everyone in Richmond
well understood at the time, that would leave the South defenseless against slave revolts.
(George Mason also argued that Congress might stimulate slave uprisings by, for example,
sending Georgia’s militia to New Hampshire.)
Even with an armed and very present militia, the South then lived in constant terror of
slave revolts. 123 Henry and Mason’s suggestion that Congress might deprive Virginia of an
armed militia had to be profoundly disturbing. They went as far as to suggest that Congress
might deliberately disarm the militia to undermine the slave system. “Slavery is detested,”
Patrick Henry reminded his audience. 124 “The majority of Congress is to the north,” he
added, “and the slaves are to the South.” 125 When Madison tried to rebut these arguments by
suggesting that if Congress did not arm the militia, the states could do so themselves, he was
ridiculed. What did it mean to provide that Congress had specific powers over the militia
and the states had other specific powers? Certainly that did not mean that all of those powers
were concurrent between the national and state governments.
Madison and the Federalists ultimately prevailed, albeit only by a vote of 88 to 80, and
Virginia ratified the Constitution and joined the Union. But, I believe, when Madison went
off to the First Congress the following year representing Virginia in the House of
Representatives politically committed to writing a Bill of Rights, he sought to fix the
problem identified by Henry and Mason and to ensure that the states could have an armed
militia regardless of Congress’ desire.
With all of this in mind, consider the words of the Second Amendment anew: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

VII.
I shall conclude with two short, personal stories.
In 1987, I was elected to the board of directors of the organization that is known today
as the Brady Campaign. It was then Handgun Control Inc. (HCI). At about the time I joined
the board, HCI decided to make the Brady Bill its flagship objective. In its original form, the
Brady Bill would have created a nationwide, seven-day waiting period for handgun
purchases. I questioned the wisdom of that effort. Nearly half of the states already had
waiting periods, some longer than seven days. California, I believe, had a fifteen-day waiting
period. I knew of no data suggesting that waiting periods were effective in reducing handgun
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deaths. Why, therefore, should we put all of our effort behind this proposal? The top officers
believed that HCI needed a legislative victory to show its members it was making progress,
and they wanted that victory in the next congressional session. The Brady Bill was so
reasonable, so moderate, and so commonsensical that even the NRA could not oppose it
without humiliating itself. The bill would breeze through the next session of Congress, they
argued.
The NRA, however, did not seem embarrassed about opposing the bill. It did so with
the same passion and fury it would have mustered if HCI had sought to confiscate all guns.
In fact, that was pretty much the NRA argument: the Brady Bill was a ploy to get America
to take a first step on a slippery slope that would eventually lead to banning guns. Not so,
countered HCI. We favor only common-sense gun control measures. We do not support
banning handguns.
Public opinion seemed to be overwhelmingly on HCI’s side. During the seven-year
campaign, HCI provided its board members with every poll on the Brady Bill. My
recollection is that national polls were consistently over 90 percent and over the entire seven
years there was not a single state poll, even in states such as Virginia and Montana, in which
less than 80 percent of respondents favored a seven-day waiting period for handgun
purchases. 126 That level of support was practically unheard of, then or now, for any issue.
Nevertheless, year after year the NRA successfully held off the legislation. The reason
for its success was simple: while the overwhelming majority of people favored the bill, for
them the issue was not do-or-die. It was not a decisive factor in the voting booth. Meanwhile,
although the number of voters against a waiting period was relatively tiny, many of them
considered the issue the most important issue of all. They told their congressional
representatives that they would never again for vote for them if they voted for the Brady Bill,
and they clearly meant it. I remember discussing the bill at the time with a Democratic
congressman representing a mostly suburban Philadelphia district that stretched into rural
areas. I told him that supporting the measure would cost him no more than one percent of
the electorate. “Do you know what my margin was in the last election?” he asked. It had
been less than one percent. “This is not an issue over which I am prepared to lose my seat,”
he said. And why should it have been? There was evidence then (or now) that the Brady Bill
would actually save lives.
The Brady Act was, of course, ultimately enacted in 1993. In fact, its passage did
provide some political momentum; the following year a federal assault weapons ban was
included in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The argument for banning
assault weapons was that there is no legitimate reason for private citizens to own militarystyle weapons. The weapons were defined by certain features, including whether they had a
pistol grip, flash suppressor, barrel shroud, folding stock, or bayonet mount. A gun
containing at least two of nineteen specified features was deemed to be an assault weapon.
The NRA argued that the objection to these weapons was merely cosmetic; they might look
more dangerous than standard hunting rifles, but they were functionally the same. All semiautomatic weapons, including those not designated as assault weapons, are capable of firing
rounds as rapidly as the shooter can pull the trigger, allowing for rates of fire approaching
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or even exceeding a round per second. 127 The NRA had a legitimate point. Nevertheless, the
assault weapons looked especially fearsome, and this measure too enjoyed broad public
support. When it passed the House on August 21, 1994, 46 Republicans voted for it. 128
There was, however, one aspect of the assault weapon ban that was of potential
consequence: high-capacity magazines. The legislation essentially defined gun magazines
capable of holding more than ten rounds to be assault weapons. Thirty-round magazines had
been common. High-capacity magazines provide little benefit for hunters and target shooters
– but they are enormously useful to mass murderers. The legislation purported to ban
magazines holding more than ten rounds. Someone equipped with ten-round magazines must
replace empty magazines with full magazines three times more often than someone equipped
with thirty-round magazines. While it only takes a few seconds to reload this way, those few
seconds give victims a chance to escape or to attack the shooter. For example, the man who
shot Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and eighteen other people in Tucson, was
successfully tackled by bystanders while he was attempting to replace the empty magazine
in his Glock 19 handgun, and nine children successfully fled from the classroom with shooter
at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newton, Connecticut while he was reloading. 129
The ban on high-capacity magazines was, however, a mirage. Not only did the
legislation grandfather assault weapons that were manufactured before the legislation
passed, it also grandfathered high-capacity magazines manufactured before that date. An
estimated 25 million high-capacity magazines were in private hands when the legislation
was passed – they were, in fact, heavily promoted while the legislation was pending
Congress, and sold like hotcakes – and another 4.7 million exempted high-capacity
magazines were imported to the U.S. during the first five years the legislation was effect. 130
High-capacity magazines remained readily available throughout the ten-year life of the ban.
Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania found that while the number of assault
weapons in private hands declined while the law was in effect, that decline was offset by a
rise in weapons equipped with high-capacity magazines. 131
The Brady Campaign spent its political capital on legislation that did not, in fact, make
America safer. While Brady and other gun control advocates may have thought they would
improve these pieces of legislation down the road, the public believed that the best available
gun control measures had been enacted and lost interest in the issue. According to the Gallup
Poll, the percentage of Americans who believe that gun control laws “should be made more
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strict” declined from 78 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in 2013. 132 Most importantly, the
Brady Act entrenched acceptance of the good guy/bad guy model. Everyone accepted the
premise that it is possible “to keep guns out of the wrong hands.”
The gun control movement has never recovered from its Pyrrhic victories in 1993 and
1994. Moreover, it may well be the case that acceptance of the good guy/bad guy model led
Supreme Court justices to believe that their decision in Heller had no adverse public health
consequences. They made it clear that convicted felons and other dangerous people could be
prohibited from purchasing and possessing guns.
Here is the second story. In 1996, Common Cause of Rhode Island launched a campaign
to get Rhode Island to recognize the principle of separation of powers in its state
government. 133 The state legislature took the position that Rhode Island government was
unique and did not accept that principle. As a result, the legislature could – in addition to
creating and funding administrative agencies – also operate them. The legislature
accomplished this by creating agencies controlled by a commission or a board, and gave
itself – i.e., the legislature – the ability to appoint a majority of the controlling body. In the
federal system, that would violate the principle of separation of powers and be flatly
unconstitutional. The Rhode Island legislature even appointed sitting legislators to agency
boards and commissions. This was a system vulnerable to – some might even say designed
for – corruption. 134
The state Common Cause chapter took on the issue. First, Common Cause took the
matter to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. But the court, whose members had also been
effectively selected by the legislature, upheld the legislature’s position. 135 Common Cause
then launched a campaign for a constitutional amendment. Most people, including the state’s
savviest political strategists, considered that a fool’s errand. The state constitution could not
be amended without the consent of the legislature. The legislature would not willingly yield
an enormous source of its power absent a firestorm of voter displeasure. Voters cared about
issues such as schools, taxes, and potholes, and were not going to understand, let alone
become outraged, over an abstract principle of political philosophy. And yet, Common
Cause persisted. It educated journalists and community leaders; it sent speakers to
community groups of all kinds; it organized forums, lectures, and debates; its members wrote
op-eds and letters-to-the-editor for newspapers. It was a vigorous and sustained effort of
public education. During the seven-year campaign, the Providence Journal published nearly
800 news articles, editorials, commentary articles, and letters-to-the-editor about separation
of powers.
Other good government groups initially joined the effort but fell by the wayside as the
campaign stretched on. Their familiar calculation was that they had to show their members
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they had achieved something recently. Yet, year after year, separation of powers remained
Common Cause’s flagship proposal. Voters began peppering state legislators with questions
– and increasingly passionate demands – about separation of powers. Legislators started
offering cosmetic concessions that would have allowed Common Cause to claim victory
while actually accomplishing little. Common Cause rejected those offers. Eventually, a
government scandal provided the spark that ignited a firestorm. For days on end, local talk
radio was all about separation of powers. Voters sent the General Assembly so many emails
that its system crashed. In the end, the legislature and voters approved a truly meaningful
constitutional amendment.
The lesson of these two stories – as well as the NRA’s successful campaign to change
how the Supreme Court interpreted the Second Amendment – is that it is sometimes
necessary and possible to take the long view. Despite conventional wisdom, neither the NRA
nor Common Cause of Rhode Island were institutionally weakened by doing so.
What would a decades-long campaign to look like? Both the Common Cause campaign
to amend the Rhode Island Constitution and the NRA campaign to change the meaning of
the Second Amendment had strong similarities. Both campaigns began with academic
writings, which were used to give the non-consensus view legitimacy and persuade opinion
makers such as leaders of advocacy groups, potential financial supporters, politicians, other
academics and teachers, and – perhaps most importantly – journalists. The writings were
expanded to popular venues such as the op-ed pages of newspapers. In the case of gun
control, op-eds could be produced by authors with recognized expertise such as
criminologists, sociologists, epidemiologists and public health experts, or more often, by
newspaper columnists and journalists describing the work of researchers. The message must
be the simple, hard truth about gun control: effective gun control is available, but it requires
reducing handguns in general circulation. It is a message that the American public has not
heard because gun control advocates, for political and institutional reasons, have led
Americans to believe the myth that less draconian, “common sense” measures are available.
At the first the message will seem jarring, but that may help it get attention. Because this is
a long campaign, it is not necessary – indeed, it may even be counterproductive – to combine
it with a plea of quick political action. The first, essential task is to tell the simple, hard truth
and let it sink in. Both the message and its importance should be repeated wherever it is
relevant. In debates over health care costs, for example, it should be noted that reducing gun
violence would reduce public health care costs because gunshot wounds result in extremely
expensive emergency room and trauma center visits. Both the NRA and Common Cause
also effectively sent speakers to every venue that would have them – community groups,
college clubs, social action committees of churches and other religious organizations, and
radio talk shows.
What I have described so far is necessary but by itself insufficient. Arguments based on
facts and logic may persuade a necessary cohort of opinion leaders, but they will not, by
themselves, create a sea change in public opinion. Consider this statement by the eighteenth
century Scottish politician Andrew Fletcher:
I knew a very wise man [who] believed if a man were permitted to make all the
ballads he need not care who should make the laws of a nation, and we find that
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most of the ancient legislators thought that they could not well reform the manners
of any city without the help of a lyric, and sometimes of a dramatic poet. 136
Everyone today is familiar with the term “designated driver.” Many of us have been one
or had someone else be one when going out on the town with a group of friends. It was not
always so. When I was a college student, neither the term nor the concept were known. In
1986, experts at the Harvard School of Public Health who wanted to do something about
drunk driving met with hundreds of Hollywood screenwriters and producers, introduced
them to the term, and asked them to include it in television scripts.137 Over a four-year
period, the term “designated driver” was used in 160 prime-time television shows. In some
shows, it was mentioned only in passing; in other shows, it was integral to the main plot line.
This campaign had a profound effect on public attitudes and behavior. My point is not that
the gun control movement must replicate the designated driver campaign for every campaign
is different. My point is that, just as Andrew Fletcher suggested three hundred years ago, sea
changes in public attitudes require help from artists and storytellers.
Storytellers are evocative. I can create a bar chat, but storytellers know how to paint
indelible images in their audience’s mind. For example, a moment ago I made a point about
the costs of treating gunshot wounds in hospital emergency rooms. In his novel Balance of
Power, Richard North Patterson has a fictional President of the United States also speak
about gunshot wounds and emergency rooms while advocating stricter gun control in a
speech to Congress. Here is the line Patterson wrote for his fictitious President: “Only in
America, in this city, do surgeons prepare for combat duty by training at an urban
hospital…” 138
We should also listen to the storytellers for their instincts about how public opinion on
the issue might be shaped. Richard North Patterson’s Balance of Power is about an effort to
persuade the nation to accept more rigorous gun control, and so is John Madden’s 2016 film
Miss Sloane. 139 In both stories, gun control advocates successfully employ strategies based
upon making gun control a more salient issue for women and exposing the commercial
interests of the gun lobby, as well as the self-interest of politicians who do its bidding.
Moreover, in both stories the winning strategies are built on a combination of public
education and carefully crafted evocative approaches.
The NRA has been a master of the evocative stratagem. It had, for example, the foresight
to make Charlton Heston its president for a five year period beginning in 1998. The famous
actor’s value to the NRA was extremely simple – it was nothing more than the image of
Heston holding a musket over his head and declaring, “From my cold, dead hands!” This
became ritual at the NRA’s annual convention and was inevitably included in that evening’s
television newscasts. It was a double-barreled subliminal image. It semi-consciously evoked
Moses, whom Heston famously played in Cecil B. DeMille’s 1956 movie The Ten
Commandments, 140 holding up his staff against Pharaoh and leading his people to freedom
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under Devine guidance. Probably more significantly, it simultaneously evoked the
Minuteman at Lexington and Concord. The power of such images should not be
underestimated, and when deployed must be decoded and rebutted. That second image can
be turned completely around by communicating that the Second Amendment was not written
to protect the musket in the hands of the Minute Man in Lexington; it was written to protect
the musket in the hands of the militia slave patrols in the South. 141 I have written a law
review article laying out that case; but to be effective it needs to be turned into a movie.
Finally, we need to be clear about the choice before us. The choice is not whether
America will have effective gun control today. The choice is whether America will have
effective gun control in the future. While public opinion, politics, and constitutional law
currently bar the way, all three are malleable. The public, politicians, and judges can all be
educated. That must begin, however, with telling the simple, hard truth about gun control.
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